Received:
2018-02-15 | Accepted:
2018-04-20 | Published:
2018-06-30
Title
Models for the interaction between space services providers and manufacturers of space vehicles
Abstract
The authors have formed the space market structure which is distinguished by the junctional formation of the summed demand for a product or service between the participants at the same stage, which serves as a basis for the formation of demand at the next stages. The peculiarities of participants’ interaction on the space services market are associated with incomplete awareness. It is advisable to use the methodological approach considered in the theory of contracts in the case of asymmetric information to develop models of interaction between market participants. Thus, based on the theory of contracts and taking into account the specifics of interaction in this article the authors have described the models for the generation of an optimal contract for the manufacturer of space vehicles and space services providers. The models are presented for the cases with symmetric and asymmetric information. As a result of solution of the task for the generation of an optimal contract, such parameters of the contract as satellite performance, the price of its information throughput unit, as well as the cumulative indicator of its technical and operational characteristics can be found in the course of interaction between these participants of the space market. The determined parameters of the contract allow maximizing the profit of the manufacturer of space vehicles.
Keywords
decision model, contract theory, world space market, generation of an optimal contract, information symmetry, information asymmetry
JEL classifications
C70
, L11
, L14
URI
http://jssidoi.org/jesi/article/187
DOI
HAL
Pages
846-857
This is an open access issue and all published articles are licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Authors
Samara State Aerospace University (National Research University), Samara, Russian Federation
https://ssau.ru
Samara State Aerospace University (National Research University), Samara, Russian Federation
https://ssau.ru
Volgograd State Technical University, Volgograd, Russian Federation
http://vstu.ru
Journal title
Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues
Volume
5
Number
4
Issue date
June 2018
Issue DOI
ISSN
ISSN 2345-0282 (online)
Publisher
VšĮ Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, Vilnius, Lithuania
Cited
Article views & downloads
HTML views: 4338 | PDF downloads: 1773
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